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Abstract The emerging field of social signal processing
can benefit from a theoretical framework to guide future
research activities. The present article aims at drawing
attention to two areas of research that devoted considerable
efforts to the understanding of social behaviour: ethology
and social psychology. With a long tradition in the study of
animal signals, ethology and evolutionary biology have
developed theoretical concepts to account for the func-
tional significance of signalling. For example, the consid-
eration of divergent selective pressures responsible for the
evolution of signalling and social cognition emphasized the
importance of two classes of indicators: informative cues
and communicative signals. Social psychology, on the
other hand, investigates emotional expression and inter-
personal relationships, with a focus on the mechanisms
underlying the production and interpretation of social sig-
nals and cues. Based on the theoretical considerations
developed in these two fields, we propose a model that
integrates the processing of perceivable individual features
(social signals and cues) with contextual information, and
we suggest that output of computer-based processing sys-
tems should be derived in terms of functional significance
rather than in terms of absolute conceptual meaning.
Keywords Social signals  Social cues  Social cognition 
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Introduction
This paper aims at describing how empirical analyses of
behaviour can inform the field of social signal processing
(SSP), conceived here as the automatic analysis and syn-
thesis of human social signals by computer systems
(Pentland 2007; Vinciarelli et al. 2009). The concepts that
will be presented in this article derive from a number of
disciplines that dedicated considerable effort to the study of
communication in humans and animals. These disciplines
are ethology, behavioural ecology, evolutionary psychol-
ogy, and social psychology.1 The work done in these dis-
ciplines represents more than a century of research in the
domain of nonverbal communication and reached an
elaborate degree of conceptualization that SSP cannot
afford to ignore if it aspires to be solidly anchored in the
behavioural sciences. Conversely, conceptual develop-
ments in the behavioural sciences may only be possible
thanks to the new methodological approaches offered by
SSP. We are therefore faced with a major opportunity to
join theoretical insight from cognitive and behavioural
sciences together with machine learning and pattern rec-
ognition algorithms for the development of computational
analysis of human social behaviour. As one of the first
formal attempt to establish such collaboration on the
European continent, the social signal processing network
(SSPNet) has to provide a strong conceptual basis for
future research on SSP. This article contributes to the
establishment of this conceptual basis.
Social signal processing includes the word ‘‘social’’ and
the word ‘‘signal.’’ As human ethologists, social psychol-
ogists, and behavioural scientists, we feel that it is our task
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to elaborate on these two concepts. We will start by
introducing the theoretical background used in ethology to
study social interactions and relationships, then present a
definition of social signals (and related concepts) based on
the theoretical and empirical work conducted in ethology
and behavioural ecology. The definition will include a
presentation of different functional categories of signals.
The evolutionary function of signalling and its relevance to
SSP will be discussed. We will then elaborate on the
proximate mechanisms involved in the perception and
production of social signals as they are studied in social
psychology. In this section, we will mostly build on the
concepts developed to study emotional communication,
interpersonal perception, and social cognition. The rela-
tionship between more specifically human aspects of
communication, symbolism, and emotional expressions
will also be discussed briefly. Finally, we will present a
psycho-ethological model of what, in our view, SSP should
be able to achieve.
What is it to be social?
Sociality is concerned with all the aspects that make
individuals interact with each other to satisfy needs that
could not be achieved by individuals alone. As opposed
to the mere aggregation of organisms around favourable
environmental conditions, sociality implies interactions
between individuals. These interactions can be of dif-
ferent kinds, depending on the individuals involved and
their dispositions, needs, and goals. For example, inter-
actions can be conflicting, like in competition over
resources; they can be cooperative, when reaching a goal
depend on joint action; or they can involve dependency,
like the interactions between a newborn and its care-
takers. The set of all social interactions between, at least,
two individuals constitute a relationship, and the col-
lection of all the relationships between members of a
group constitutes the social structure (Hinde 1976).
Taken as a whole, the set of relations between different
groups constitutes society. Regulation at each level of
the social structure is achieved by the display and pro-
cessing of social signals and cues.
Sociality has evolved as an elaborate solution to face
important biological issues like defence from predators,
exploitation of resources, reproduction, and rearing of
progeny (Dunbar 1988; Janson 2000; van Schaik 1983).
Since these biological issues are common to most organ-
isms, sociality is deeply ingrained in the cognitive archi-
tecture of many species, including primates (Dunbar 1998;
Humphrey 1976; Whiten and Byrne 1988). Being integral
parts of the primate order, humans are extremely social,
and this tendency transpires in all aspects of human
activities: management of resources, reproduction, leisure,
art, media, religion, etc. Because the emergence of sociality
as an evolutionary stable strategy precedes by far the
apparition of the human species on the tree of evolution, a
conceptual analysis of social signals cannot ignore the
research findings and theoretical developments made in
disciplines investigating the biology of behaviour in other
animal species. We adopt the position that many aspects of
our current social behaviour reflect adaptations to social
problems that arose during the evolutionary history of
primates.
Although sociality brings important survival and repro-
ductive advantages, it also comes with costs, for example,
increased competition for resources such as food or sexual
partners. Social behaviour and cognition—the full reper-
toire of which can be called social strategies—have
evolved precisely to help organisms achieve the right pay-
off balance between the costs and benefits of group living.
Living in large and complex groups, it became very
important for individuals to accurately respond to contin-
gencies such as: Whom to mate with? Whom to rely on in
social alliances? Whom to avoid during conflicts? The
ability to acquire and process up to date social knowledge
about group members whose values and dispositions can
fluctuate over time is considered as the hallmark of cog-
nition in apes and humans (Barrett et al. 2003). Similarly,
individuals who could successfully advertise their personal
qualities as valuable mates, successful leaders, or serious
contenders in conflicts (or individuals who could influence
others into believing that they possess such qualities)
enjoyed serious survival and reproductive benefits. The
monitoring of group members and the management of
interpersonal encounters are achieved through communi-
cation (Owings and Morton 1997), which can therefore be
considered as one of the most significant biological adap-
tations of primates.
There is an increasing tendency in ethology to con-
sider communication as an adaptive solution to manage
and assess the social environment (Krebs and Dawkins
1984; Owings and Morton 1997; Owren et al. 2010). On
the one hand, individuals have to organize social infor-
mation in a way that helps them take adaptive decisions.
This means: to make the right social choice at the right
time; to know what one needs from others and what
others’ needs are; and to seek adaptive traits and dispo-
sitions in others. Communication skills also require that
individuals know when it is the right moment to display,
consciously or not, a potent behaviour and to advertise,
deceptively or not, his/her own intentions and disposi-
tions. The management and assessment of the social
environment are achieved through the production and
perception of social signals and the cognitive processing
of social cues.
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What is a social signal?
To our eyes, ethology offers a useful definition of signals
because it is not bound to the attribution of specific meaning to
signals, nor to the idea that signals are produced intentionally
to convey information. In its broadest sense, a signal is an act
or structure that influences the behaviour of other organisms,
which evolved because of that effect, and which is adaptive
because the receiver’s response has also evolved (Maynard-
Smith and Harper 1995, 2003). It is generally accepted that
signals ‘‘carry’’ information that is adaptive to the receiver
otherwise receivers would cease to respond. Indeed, it is
believed that the risk of deception and social exploitation
placed a strong selective pressure on receivers to develop
mind reading abilities that discriminate signals associated
with adaptive information from deceptive and manipulative
signals. The evolution of mind-reading abilities, in turn,
placed a selection pressure on signals to become more reliable.
It implies that the evolution of signalling has led to a reliable
communication system in which senders and receivers benefit
from the transfer of information (Zahavi and Zahavi 1997).
An alternative view of signalling places the functional
emphasis on social influence rather than on information transfer
(Owren et al. 2010). The influence principle is well illustrated in
a quote by Krebs and Dawkins (1984, p. 380): ‘‘Just as a wing
performs its normal function by working on the air, so a signal
performs its normal function by working on another animal via
its sense organs.’’ According to this view, what matters for a
signal to evolve is to have a positive impact on the signaller’s
fitness, irrespective of whether the perceiver benefits by
acquiring some information. In a recent essay on the meaning of
animal signals, Rendall et al. (2009) emphasized the weak-
nesses of an approach based on the transfer of information
between a sender and a receiver to explain animal communi-
cation. They contend that information is too vaguely defined as
a concept to constitute the central aspect of signalling. In their
view, signals mainly evolved to match receiver’s perceptual
systems implying that a signal’s properties are not sources of
information per se but are means of improving detectability and
localizability, but also to avoid habituation. Although their
critique is mainly focused on the way ethologists reflect on
animal communication, it underlines the importance of con-
sidering alternative explanations for the evolution of human
nonverbal behaviour (Owren and Bachorowski 2003).
As psychologists, we find it relatively uncomfortable
that ethological definitions of social signals are not directly
applicable to human communication, as they usually avoid
the topics of symbolism and language.2 Ethologists indeed
recognize that language has its own rules that are separate
from those governing animal signals (Rendall et al. 2009).
However, the importance of multimodal communication
makes it difficult to approach the study of social signals
without considering language and its complex interactions
with nonverbal behaviour. For example, the meaning of
words can be modulated by visual behaviour (Bavelas and
Chovil 2000), and some ‘‘nonverbal’’ acts, like emblems,
can have a direct verbal translation that is understood by all
members of a group, class, or culture (Efron 1941; Ekman
and Friesen 1969). Similarly, gestural codes like sign lan-
guage present properties that characterize the most elabo-
rate systems of symbolic communication. Therefore, we
feel that refinement of the ethological definition should be
made in order to accommodate the specificities of human
communication.
We formulate here a modified definition of social signals
that integrates ethological and symbolic aspects: human
social signals are acts or structures that influence the
behaviour or internal state of other individuals, that evolve
because of that effect, and that are effective because the
perceiver’s response has also evolved; signals may or may
not convey conceptual information or meaning. The influ-
ence of signals on internal states reflects changes in cog-
nitive, physiological, and emotional experience following
the perception of a signal. This refers, for example, to the
modification of cognitive representation after exposure to
conceptual information; to the alteration of emotional state
following the hearing of laughter (Bachorowski and Owren
2001) or infant cries (Frodi et al. 1978); or to the increase
in testosterone following exposure to odours of opposite
sex individuals (Miller and Maner 2010). The cognitive,
emotional, and physiological changes that follow the per-
ception of signals may be associated with a behavioural
response that should, on average, benefit the signaller. In
some cases, the perceiver also benefits from the signal,
although the benefits are derived from adaptive inferences
made on the basis of the signal rather than from the
properties of the signal itself.
The important aspect of this definition is that the
encoding of information is not necessary for an act or
structure to be called a signal, as we believe that encoding3
is restricted to only a subset of social signals (namely,
symbolic, or conventional signals). The difference between
the present definition and the one provided by Maynard-
Smith and Harper (1995, 2003) for animal signals is that
our definition clearly encompasses the idea that some
aspects of human communication involve the coding of
mental representations into concepts that can then be
transferred using symbolic or conventional signals, which
2 Although this topic is still hotly debated (Owren et al. 2010;
Seyfarth and Cheney 2003), semantic aspects may also be present in
the communication system of non-human primates (Arnold and
Zuberbu¨hler 2006; Seyfarth et al. 1980).
3 We will discuss the issue of encoding in a later section of this
paper.
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meaning is understood by perceivers who possess the
appropriate, culture-specific, decoding rule to retrieve
the mental representation that was originally encoded by
the signaller.
Ethologists have noted that the reliable transfer of
information through the encoding of individual dispositions
into a signal may be maladaptive because it could expose
signallers to social exploitation (Grammer et al. 1997;
Krebs and Dawkins 1984) and ultimately lead to the
extinction of informative signals. For informative signals to
be evolutionarily stable, both the signaller and perceiver
have to benefit from the transfer of information (Hinde
1981; Maynard-Smith and Harper 2003), which is only the
case in mutualistic or cooperative interactions. Although
these contexts may be more the exception than the rule as
far as nonhuman species are concerned (Owren et al.
2010), cooperative interactions are believed to be the
ground for the evolution of symbolic communication in
humans (Smith 2010; Tomasello 2008), which in turn plays
a major role in maintaining large social groups together
(Dunbar 1999). Thus, one particularity of human commu-
nication is that a fair proportion of informative signals are
used in everyday interactions to smooth the functioning of
cooperative groups.
Another aspect that makes human communication par-
ticular is that some social signals (mostly the conventional
and symbolic signals) are produced intentionally. It is not
to say that other animals do not communicate intentionally,
there are indeed a number of anecdotes suggesting that
nonhuman primates use signals intentionally to deceive
others, but the evidence in that respect is much harder to
gather. A large part of human communication is intentional
and is built on the signaller’s understanding that the
meaning of arbitrary units of communication is shared with
perceivers. Intentionality in communication refers to the
ability of the signaller to control the production of a given
signal and to understand its consequences on perceivers.
The encoding of information into conventional signals
implies a certain degree of intentionality, for encoding
requires the manipulation of conceptual information and
the anticipation of social consequences of the signalling
act. Social signals such as pointing may be fundamentally
human and are believed to be the first instances of coop-
erative communication (Tomasello 2008, p. 11). More
precisely, Tomasello suggested that pointing functions to
create shared intentionality, assumed to be a building block
of symbolic communication. The integration of symbolic
signals in human communication will be addressed in a
later section.
Human biological adaptations for communication
therefore entail a large variety of signal types, ranging
from signals which production depends on complex
interactions between psychobiological and contextual
factors, and which relationships with ‘‘referents’’ such as
internal states and future behaviour are only probabilistic;
to conventional or symbolic signals that can be produced
intentionally for informative purposes and which rela-
tionships with referents are the object of a consensus
among members of a given cultural group (i.e., signals
with meaning). We will argue that the first class of signals
involve most of the nonverbal aspects of human com-
munication and retained the functional principle of influ-
ence; whereas semantic aspects, that is, verbal utterances
and symbolic acts like emblems (Efron 1941; Ekman and
Friesen 1969) and some gestures (Duncan 1972; Kendon
1988; McNeill 2005) constitute the informative compo-
nents of communication. It is the interaction between
these components that make signals more efficient in
allowing individuals to better manage their social
environment.
The complex interaction between verbal and nonverbal
behaviour therefore requires that both the social influence
and informational aspects be considered. Although words
and symbolic acts carry specific meaning, it is possible that
influence or authenticity is achieved through the use of
nonverbal cues, in particular, the emotional characteristics
of signals like subtle facial movements or specific vocal
characteristics. In other words, the symbolic units of
communication (e.g., words, emblems, etc.) would fulfil
the informative function of social signalling; whereas a
large portion of nonverbal signals, not intrinsically loaded
with specific information, would make the meaning con-
veyed through symbolic signals more authentic or more
influential. The relevance of this argument to SSP is that
automatic analysis may wish to focus on the investigation
of function—through an analysis of contexts and conse-
quences of social signals, rather than exclusively focus on
the search of a meaning for every single perceptible unit of
behaviour.
Social signals versus social cues
Social signals are defined as entities that evolved as a result
of their effects on perceivers. There is another class of
entities also relevant to communication but of a different
nature than signals in that they have not evolved as com-
municative units. These entities have been called cues
(Hasson 1994; Lorenz 1939) and are defined as features of
the world that can be used by other individuals as a guide
to future action. The difference between social cues and
social signals is subtle but is essential to understand the
intricacies of communication. The crucial element here is
that for social cues to evolve, there is no need for per-
ceptual systems in the environment, as their function, if
any, is found outside the realm of communication. For
S400 Cogn Process (2012) 13 (Suppl 2):S397–S414
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signals to evolve, however, there has to be some perceptual
systems coupled with responding ability.
The difference between cues and signals can be illus-
trated with the following example: consider a tree, which
branches bend due to the action of the wind. An observer
can easily deduce that the wind goes in a certain direction
by looking at the branches. Since we can make the rea-
sonable assumption that flexibility is a property of branches
that has not evolved to communicate information about
wind direction, or to provoke a response in observers, the
overall stimulus that lead to our knowledge of wind
direction is seen as a cue. If, on the other hand, the same
observer finds himself at an aerodrome and sees a wind-
sock floating in the wind, he will also be able to infer the
direction of the wind, and eventually its speed. Although
the knowledge gained through observation of the tree and
the windsock is the same, the difference with the tree is that
the windsock has been conceived and designed to provoke
a cognitive response in individuals looking for information
about wind direction and speed (i.e., to communicate the
direction and speed of wind). The windsock is therefore
considered as a signal. In the case of the tree, some
information is only extracted by an observer, whereas in
the windsock example, some information is made available
through the properties of the instrument. A social cue is
therefore a perceivable stimulus produced by an organism,
which perceivers can use to take adaptive decisions. Unlike
a social signal, a social cue may not necessarily benefit the
producer of that cue in a social context.
Social signals can be classified according to their nature
(sound waves, chemicals, morphological structure, etc.),
the modality they target (vision, audition, etc.), their
dynamic properties (permanent vs. transient), and their
function (what benefit they bring to the signaller). An
example of classification is presented in Table 1. At this
stage, it is important to mention that emotions, attitudes,
personality, or social stances are not social signals as such
but are psychological phenomena that are not directly
accessible to the outside observer and that constitute the
information that perceivers are eager to infer from the
perception of social cues and signals. By definition, social
cues and signals are perceivable entities that can be used by
individuals to draw inferences about internal characteristics
of the signaller or about specific aspects of the
environment.
Although not specifically designed by evolution to
function in a social context, some cues are nonetheless
associated with social information sought by perceivers to
make socially adaptive decisions. Cues that provide social
information can be ordered in two categories: physiological
responses and motor responses (Morris 1956). Physiolog-
ical responses include observable features of thermoregu-
lation, respiration, pupil dilation, pilo-erection; whereas
motor responses include intention movements, protective
actions, displacement activities, and possibly emotional
expressions. It is believed that, through an evolutionary
process called ritualization (Huxley 1966), signals evolved
from the cues that were used by perceivers to construct
representations about their social environment. Given the
increased specialization of sense organs and brain struc-
tures to process and make connections among environ-
mental stimuli that are adaptive to the organism
(Rosenzweig et al. 2002), and because of the importance of
the social environment in primates evolutionary history
(Dunbar 1998; Humphrey 1976; Whiten and Byrne 1988),
it is reasonable to assume that perceivers became relatively
specialized in the inference of information from nonverbal
cues via associative learning. These cognitive abilities
constituted the psychological landscape on which social
signals evolved.
Signals differ from cues in four ways (Wiley 1983;
Johnstone 1997). First, in order to increase the likelihood
of detection by perceivers, signals are more conspicuous
and more noticeable than cues. Second, signals are more
redundant than cues. Redundancy is achieved by increasing
the repetition rate of the signal over time or by adding
elements to it, like in multimodal signals. Third, signals are
more stereotyped than cues, as they are relatively consis-
tent over time and show little variation in timing and
intensity. Finally, signals may include alerting components
to warn perceivers that a signal will occur. Consequently,
social signals should be detected more easily than cues but
their information content should be treated more carefully.
Indeed, if we consider that signals have mostly evolved to
benefit signallers, there is more room for deception and
manipulation, hence more uncertainty about the adaptive
Table 1 Different types of signals and examples of functional domains of adaptation
Nature Modality Dynamic properties Examples of function Examples of signals
Chemical Olfaction Transient Mate choice Pheromone
Sound wave Audition Transient Intra-sexual competition Vocalization
Morphological structure Vision, touch Permanent Mate choice Skin texture
Muscular contraction Vision, touch Transient Cooperation Facial display
Artefacts Multiple Permanent/transient Cooperation Traffic light
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character of the inferred information. On the other hand,
cues have evolved for other purposes than communication
and should present more consistent relationships with
physical or social properties of the environment. Therefore,
because their evolution is more independent from social
contingencies (including influence and manipulation),
social cues should be more reliable sources of information
than social signals. The features that distinguish informa-
tive cues from social signals are of prime importance to
SSP because the ability to detect and to link behavioural
patterns to useful information will depend on the nature of
what is perceived.
The reliability of social signals
The question of reliability refers to the relationship that a
signal maintains with some underlying quality of the
signaller that is of interest to a perceiver. Ethologists and
evolutionary biologists have argued that a signal should
be, on average, reliable because it is related to a receiver’s
response that would, in the case of unreliable signalling,
cease to exist (Maynard-Smith and Harper 2003; Zahavi
and Zahavi 1997). There are three ways in which signals
could be reliable: (a) the cost of the signal is too high for
signallers that do not possess the quality to be advertised,
in which case the signal is called a handicap (Zahavi
1975); (b) signaller and perceiver place the outcome of
information transfer in the same order of preference, in
this case the entity is called a minimal-cost signal; and
(c) the signal cannot be faked due to physical constraints,
in which case it is called an index (Maynard-Smith and
Harper 1995). We will now present these three possibili-
ties in more detail.
In a very influential text, Zahavi and Zahavi (1997)
argued that signals are honest indicators of an individual’s
attributes. They contended that the cost of the signal
guarantees its honesty because it is directly related to the
disposition it is meant to advertise. This implies that in
order to be reliable, a signal must be costly, that is, it must
seriously impair the fitness of individuals who do not
posses the quality in such a way that they are prevented
from producing the signal. As a consequence, the signal is
only produced by individuals who possess the quality.
Zahavi and Zahavi (1997) claimed that a decrease in a
signal’s cost would diminish its signalling value because it
would allow all individuals in a population to display the
signal and, as a result, prevent perceivers from discrimi-
nating between individuals who possess the trait from those
who do not. This proposition is called the handicap prin-
ciple, and a costly reliable signal is called a handicap.
Maynard-Smith and Harper (1995) have termed this type of
signals cost-added signals.
A signal’s costs can be divided in two broad categories:
efficiency costs and strategic costs (Guilford and Dawkins
1991). Efficiency costs are the costs necessary to ensure the
transmission of the signal to the perceiver; whereas stra-
tegic costs are costs incurred to ensure the reliability of the
signal (e.g., handicaps or cost-added signals). Strategic
costs are further divided into production costs, that is, the
physiological and metabolic expenditures needed to pro-
duce and maintain the morphological structure or the
behavioural pattern; and in perceiver-related costs, which
are the costs incurred by perceivers’ response to the signal,
for example, increased risks of competition and predation,
or retaliation (punishment) if a signalling convention is
breached (Vehrencamp 2000). A detailed analysis of these
costs is necessary to understand the functional significance
of human social signals. Unfortunately, psychological sci-
ence has invested very little research efforts in this
direction.
Like most signals, multimodal signals include both
efficacy and strategic costs. We adopt the position that
multi-component signals evolved to face two constraints
imposed by receiver’s psychology: perceptibility and
responsiveness (Rowe 1999). The first constraint can be
met by adding elements to a signal to improve its detect-
ability, discriminability, and memorability (Guilford and
Dawkins 1991; Rowe 1999), but also to prevent habituation
(Searcy 1992). The second constraint can be met by adding
elements that ensure reliability, for instance, components
that rely on physiological processes reflecting dispositions
that are adaptive to perceivers. We suggest that—because
of their association with automatic cognitive appraisal,
physiological preparation, and action tendencies—emo-
tional expressions could act as reliable components of
communicative behaviour. In support of this claim, recent
research showed that ‘‘Duchenne smiles’’ (Ekman and
Friesen 1982)—smiles that involve the activation of
orbicularis oculi, a facial muscle under the influence of
physiological arousal—is associated with altruistic dispo-
sitions (Brown et al. 2003) and perceived generosity in
faces (Mehu et al. 2007a, b). More recently, we have
shown that enacted emotional expressions that involved the
activation of facial muscles that are difficult to control
voluntarily—hence that may be under the control of the
physiological component of emotion—are more easily
identified and are perceived as being more authentic and
more intense (Mehu et al. 2012). Further investigation
should focus on the costs associated with the production of
emotional expression and on perceived authenticity of
emotionally loaded verbal utterances.
Some authors claimed that signals do not always need to
be costly to be reliable (Maynard-Smith and Harper 2003).
In fact, when the sender and receiver place the outcome of
the interaction in the same order of preference, like in
S402 Cogn Process (2012) 13 (Suppl 2):S397–S414
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cooperative interactions, there is no need for signallers to
deceive, hence signals are expected to be reliable. In these
circumstances, receivers do not need to develop resistance
to deception, which results in signals being more discreet
and their detection by perceivers highly sensitive (Krebs
and Dawkins 1984). These signals are called minimal-cost
signals (Maynard-Smith and Harper 2003). In humans,
symbolic signals like words could be considered as good
examples of minimal-cost signals, as their production cost
may be relatively low4 and their use depends on knowledge
shared by the signaller and perceiver. More research is
needed to evaluate the applicability of the concept of
minimal-cost signal to human communication.
Another specific case of low-cost reliable signalling is
the one provided by indices. An index is said to be a
reliable signal because it demonstrates a quality that cannot
be faked due to physical constrains (Maynard-Smith and
Harper 1995). Indices are usually signals that facilitate the
evaluation of a cue by a perceiver. For example, a posture
that facilitates the assessment of body size can be consid-
ered as an index. Body size is a cue to physical strength
(Sell et al. 2010) and can be enhanced by an erect posture,
like the one usually observed in the expression of pride
(Tracy and Robins 2004). In this case, perceived body size
is increased but within the limits offered by the actual size
of legs and chest. Since body size can hardly be extended
beyond the postural change (exception made of the use of
cultural artefacts), the behavioural pattern that makes it
salient is an index that reliably advertises body size and its
associated dispositions.
Although the circumstances favourable to the evolution
of reliable and informative signals may be relatively rare in
animal communication (Owren et al. 2010), the prevalence
of symbolic signals and intentional communication in
human interactions is not negligible and is believed to have
paralleled the evolution of cooperation and group cohesion
(Dunbar 1999; Ga¨rdenfors 2002; Smith 2010; Tomasello
2008). The relation between symbolic and nonsymbolic
signals will be addressed in a later section, and we would
like to conclude this part by underlying the importance of
the ethological perspective for the field of Social signal
processing. The detection and interpretation of honest sig-
nals should be informed by (a) the analysis of efficacy costs
and strategic costs, (b) consideration of the relationship
between signaller and perceiver, and (c) the physical con-
strains that underline the signal and its possible association
with informative cues. Taking into account these three
functional aspects of signals (handicaps, minimal-cost sig-
nals, and indices) should greatly increase our understanding
of a signal’s function but also enhance predictions about the
future course of an individual’s behavioural stream. The
distinction between signals and cues should be of prime
importance to SSP because of their differential associations
with underlying characteristics of the signaller. Perceptual
models should include the possibility that, although cues
will be less conspicuous hence more difficult to detect than
signals, their information content should be more reliable
because of a more stable relationship with underlying
characteristics of the signaller that potentially interest per-
ceiver. Similarly, the selection of signal features should take
into account the properties of signals that have a strong
impact on perceivers not only in terms of inferred meaning
but also in terms of psychobiological responses that appear
to be adaptive to the signaller.
The production and perception of social
signals and cues
The production and perception of human social behaviour
have been widely studied in social psychology, more spe-
cifically in relation to three major aspects of social rela-
tionships: emotional processes, interpersonal attitudes, and
symbolism. The link between emotion and nonverbal
behaviour has been a major topic of psychological research
in the last five decades (Ekman and Oster 1979; Izard 1971;
Scherer and Ellgring 2007a; Tomkins and Carter 1964;
Wallbott 1998). This research suggests that emotional
behaviours represent evolved adaptive responses to fun-
damental life events (Ekman 1992; Frijda and Scherer
2009). Among these behavioural responses are specific
expressive configurations, like facial and vocal expression,
acting as signs (in our terminology, cues) that indicate the
presence of an emotional state (Ekman et al. 1980; Scherer
1986). The exact mechanisms involved in the production of
these cues have been investigated further by componential
theorists of emotion (Frijda 1988; Scherer 2001; Smith
1989). More specifically, the Componential Process Model
(Scherer 2001) posits that the activation of behavioural
units of expression depends on the result of cognitive
appraisal. In this view, complex patterns of emotional
expression reflect the cumulative effect of sequential
evaluation checks made on the environmental situation in
which the expresser finds him/herself. The efferent effects
of the cognitive evaluations simultaneously influence all
expressive modalities, the voice, face and body, and
therefore result in multimodal coherence of expression.
Detailed predictions about to the effect of cognitive
appraisal on emotional expression can be found in Scherer
(2001, 2009).
From the discussion of ethological concepts presented
earlier, one may be left with the question of whether
4 Although the development of the capacity to speak can be relatively
costly, once that capacity is acquired, there is little variability in cost
for the production of different types of words/signals.
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emotional expressions are social cues or social signals.
Although not explicitly phrased in the terms that were
defined here as cues and signals, emotional expressions
have been considered to be the vehicle of information
about emotion with a clear function in social interactions
(Buck 1994; Ekman 1992; Keltner and Kring 1998). This
view is supported by the observation that emotional
expressions have significant impacts on perceivers in a
variety of domains: social inferences (Hess et al. 2000;
Knutson 1996), competitive interactions (Camras 1980),
and cooperative actions (Brown et al. 2003; Mehu et al.
2007a, b). In addition, emotional expressions are particu-
larly salient in social contexts (Kraut and Johnston 1979;
Parkinson 2005). Still, emotional expressions have also
been shown to provide individual benefits through emo-
tional regulation (Gross and Levenson 1997; Keltner and
Bonanno 1997; Papa and Bonanno 2008) but also through
enhanced sensory acquisition (Susskind et al. 2008).
Spontaneous emotional expressions could therefore be
considered as social cues and social signals.
The Organon Model proposed by Karl Bu¨hler (1934)
represents an interesting paradigm to understand the
ambiguous nature of emotional expressions. Inspired by
this model, Scherer (1992) suggested that emotional
expressions entail three aspects: symptom, appeal, and
symbol. The symptomatic function of emotional expression
refers to their intrinsic association with underlying physi-
ological processes, that is, externalized by-products of the
latter. The symptomatic function of emotional expression is
equivalent to the concept of social cue discussed above.
The appeal function of emotional expression reflects the
social influence that they exercise on others, which corre-
sponds, in the ethological framework, to their social sig-
nalling function. Finally, the symbolic function illustrates
the formalization of emotional expressions as socially
accepted representations of emotional experience. The
ethological concept that most closely corresponds to the
symbolic function of emotional expression is that of con-
ventional signal (Guilford and Dawkins 1995). Theoretical
developments on emotional expression by psychologists
were not based on the definitions of signals that we pre-
sented here, making connections between the ethological
and psychological views of emotional expression more
difficult to make. Nonetheless, we argue that Bu¨hler’s
(1934) Organon Model can be used to draw parallels
between ethological and psychological concepts. The
challenge for modern researcher is to articulate these dif-
ferent conceptual strands in a cohesive framework to
expand our knowledge of human communication.
Research in social psychology was also inspired by
Brunswik’s Lens Model of the visual perception process
(Brunswik 1956; Hammond 1966) for the study of inter-
personal perception (Gifford 1994; Scherer 1978) and
emotional communication (Juslin and Laukka 2003; Kap-
pas 1997; Scherer 1986). The Brunswikian approach of
social perception posits that stable traits or transient states
are externalized in the form of distal cues, the perception of
which is represented as proximal percepts by receivers. The
attribution of a trait or state then results from an inference
process reflecting a psychological interpretation of the
proximal percepts (Scherer 1978). In a recent attempt to
achieve a more comprehensive view of emotional com-
munication, Scherer (2011) proposed the dynamic Tripar-
tite Emotional Expression and Perception Model (TEEP,
Fig. 1) inspired by Bu¨hler’s (1934) Organon Model and by
a modified version of Brunswik’s (1956) Lens Model.
The TEEP model proposes that a number of externalized
signs are produced by an individual as symptoms of
emotional processes with or without communicative
intentions on the part of the expresser (the symptom
function in Bu¨hler’s model). These signs are externalized
under the influence of psycho-biological factors related to
survival functions of the organism (push effects). Observ-
ers perceive these signs as proximal percepts, which in turn
form the basis for subsequent inferences and attributions.
Bu¨hler’s appeal function is reflected in the fact that prox-
imal percepts lead to a number of attributions, internal
changes, or behavioural responses by perceivers. Finally,
the socio-cultural setting strongly influences the commu-
nication process via the operationalization of convention-
alized feeling and display rules (pull effects), whereby
expressive signs are also understood as a shared symbolic
nonverbal code (Bu¨hler’s representation function).
Emotion is not the only factor underlying nonverbal
communication. Interpersonal attitudes and personality
characteristics have also been widely studied in relation to
Fig. 1 The Tripartite emotion expression and perception model
(TEEP, reproduced from Scherer 2011)
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nonverbal behaviour (Argyle and Dean 1965; Burgoon and
Poire 1999; Sadler et al. 2009; Scherer 1978; Tusing and
Dillard 2000). In this context, several authors have argued
that nonverbal behaviour expresses two major dimensions
that regulate interpersonal relationships: affiliation and
dominance (Kiesler 1983; Mehrabian and Ksionzky 1972;
Wiggins et al. 1988). As in most studies in nonverbal
communication, the link between dominance, affiliation,
and behaviour has been assessed by perceptual judgements.
As a result, little is known about the mechanism respon-
sible for the production of affiliative/dominance cues or
signals in humans, though a few studies indicate that these
cues or signals could be testosterone-dependent (Cashdan
1995; Dabbs 1997; Dabbs et al. 2001). More research is
needed to establish the connection between dominant/affi-
liative tendencies and nonverbal behaviour. In addition, the
argument that emotions also have a social function (Man-
stead and Fisher 2001; Parkinson 1996) and may act as
regulators of social relationships (Hess et al. 2000; Knutson
1996) suggests that the factors responsible for the pro-
duction of emotional expressions overlap to some extent
with those underlying affiliative and dominance cues or
signals.
From the perceiver’s point of view, emotional states of
the sender can be accurately inferred from observation of
facial expression (Ekman and Oster 1979), body move-
ments (Wallbott and Scherer 1986), and voice (Banse and
Scherer 1996), though contextual effects on inferences
based on nonverbal behaviour can be relatively strong
(Aviezer et al. 2008; Cupchik and Poulos 1984; Righart
and Gelder 2008). Inference of emotional states from
behaviour could involve: (1) hard-wired detection mecha-
nisms that automatically associate the perceived stimuli
with a discrete emotion category (Ekman 1972; Young
et al. 1997); (2) a reflex-like process of motor mimicry
whereby a perceiver unconsciously mimics, or simulates,
the behaviour of the signaller and uses the associated
proprioceptive information to infer the emotion expressed
(Lipps 1907; Niedenthal 2007); (3) a controlled cognitive
decoding process that infers information processing activ-
ity and behavioural tendencies to re-construct the emotion
experienced by the signaller (Scherer and Grandjean 2008);
(4) the use by perceivers of socio-cultural and linguistic
rules shared with the signaller to interpret his emotional
intentions; (5) an evaluation of the probability that the
perceived expression results from regulation strategies
adopted by the signaller to mask, attenuate, or exaggerate
the underlying emotional experience; and (6) the evalua-
tion of the expression with reference to situational and
interpersonal contexts (Carroll and Russell 1996), as well
as personal needs or goals. These perceptual mechanisms
range from instinctive low-level responses to elaborate
cognitive evaluations and reflect the complexity of the
processes involved in inferences made about emotional
expressions.
The finding that brief exposures to nonverbal behav-
ioural cues can lead to consensus among perceivers in
attribution of dispositional traits (Albright et al. 1988;
Borkenau et al. 2004; Funder and Colvin 1988) and a
variety of interpersonal outcomes (for a review, see
Ambady and Rosenthal 1992) suggests the presence of
shared cognitive processes for social perception. Trope
(1986) proposed two steps for the social attribution pro-
cesses: identification and inference. Identification is the
formation of a first representation of the perceived stimulus
in terms of meaningful relevant categories. This represen-
tation then serves as input for the dispositional inference
process that involves the inference of personal disposition
guided by causal schemata. Research suggests that the type
of inferences that are made revolves around two major
dimensions of social relationships: dominance and affilia-
tion (Oosterhof and Todorov 2008; Wiggins et al. 1988).
Evaluation of these dimensions appears to be particularly
adaptive for perceivers’ decisions about whether a person
should be approached or avoided, or if a person is a serious
contender in conflicts. Note that decisions of this sort could
also result from inferences about emotional expressions,
since the latter are related to action tendencies and possibly
indicate future actions. Because the ultimate function of
social perception is to build accurate representations of the
social environment (Humphrey 1976), future theoretical
development should therefore integrate models of social
inference with models for the perception of emotional
expression.
Encoding, decoding, and intentionality
in communication
A fundamental question regarding the production of non-
verbal behaviour is whether the cues or signals produced
are the result of the encoding of particular traits in a per-
ceivable entity, be it an externalized physiological
response, a sound wave, or a muscular contraction. The
question of encoding is crucial because it determines
whether signals have intrinsic meaning or whether they are
merely corollaries of physiological or behavioural pro-
cesses that have formalized in order to optimize their
impact on perceivers. Encoding is referred to as the
translation, using a code, of information in one domain
(e.g., a physiological condition of the organism) into
another domain (e.g., a muscular contraction). The result-
ing entity therefore carries information that can then be
recovered by perceivers through a process of decoding
(applying the same coding rules backward). The applica-
tion of the terms encoding–decoding to the production and
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perception of nonsymbolic aspects of nonverbal behaviour
can be misleading. First, there is no evidence for a process
that would translate internal states or stable dispositions of
the organism into observable entities. Although there are
similarities in the perception and social inferences made by
individuals, the consensus about personality traits or
emotional states of a person showing a particular behaviour
is not evidence that this behaviour is an encoded repre-
sentation of these traits or states. With regard to nonsym-
bolic signals, the terminology encoding–decoding can, at
best, be used as a metaphor to describe the externalization
process that lead to the production of signals as well as the
inference of information made by perceiver.
To some extent, the concept of encoding implies that the
different domains of activity of an organism (physiological,
cognitive, behavioural) are compartmented and that inter-
actions between subsystems would require transcoding of
information. To the contrary, we think that there is conti-
nuity between organismic subsystems (behaviour is merely
an observable physiological condition of the organism) and
that the nature of the relations between these subsystems
determines the degree of reliability of the information
inferred from the observable aspects of the process.
According to the terminology used in the previous section,
social cues and reliable signals should maintain more stable
associations with underlying cognitive and physiological
processes; whereas deceptive signals would have more
inconsistent associations with internal states. It is therefore
more plausible to conceive that the information derived
from nonsymbolic signals is not made available through a
code but through the natural relationship they maintain
with psychobiological processes.
The idea of encoding is more appropriate to explain the
generation of symbolic signals which relationship to a
referent is mostly arbitrary, hence requires the translation
of a perception into a concept that is understood as such by
all members of a given culture. The use of arbitrary signals
is indeed a particular feature of human exchanges. The
culture-specific coding and decoding rules have to be learnt
and constitute the basics of symbolic communication. As
mentioned in the previous section, the encoding of infor-
mation is not the only peculiar aspect of human commu-
nication, as intentionality in producing the signals also
plays a major role. The intentional production of symbolic
signals (e.g., language) most probably evolved in the
context of cooperative interactions because the coordina-
tion and the smooth functioning of social groups required a
more efficient transfer of adaptive information (Smith
2010), in particular, information about the activities and
whereabouts of other group members (Dunbar 1996). The
idea that language is cooperative by nature is also found in
Grice’s Cooperative Principle that is presented by him as
a major conversational rule (Grice 1989). Intentional
production of symbolic signals usually occurs in a context
in which interlocutors share knowledge and have common
intentions (see also the concept of shared intentionality,
Gilbert 1989; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007), a context
that maximizes the benefit of information transfer.
Intentionality in communication is not only concerned
with the production of encoded messages. Some intentional
behaviour such as pointing and eye gaze do not carry
specific meaning but act as powerful signals that direct a
perceiver’s attention to relevant aspects of the environ-
ment. As Tomasello (2008) recently pointed out the effi-
ciency of these signals in interpersonal communication is
ensured by the common knowledge that signallers and
perceivers share about the situation in which this particular
act of signalling takes place. Because these signals indicate
the signaller’s intentions to communicate about a particular
aspect of the environment or the interaction (the relevant
information being in the context rather than being encoded
in the signal itself), these signals could form a particular
class of meta-communicative signals, which primary
function would be to direct the perceiver’s attention to
particular pieces of information.
Although the use of symbolic signals emerged along
cooperative contexts, the benefits of their use in deceptive
communication (i.e., lying) are potentially large. Because
symbolic signals are relatively cheap to produce, any
individual who has learnt the coding–decoding rules could
potentially use them to their own advantage. The emer-
gence of symbolic communication has therefore placed
considerable pressure on mind-readers to evaluate the
authenticity of social signals, in particular, since social
groups have become larger, hence populated with people
with diverging interests. For example, lying has been
documented to be particularly frequent in everyday inter-
actions (Ekman 1985; Vrij 2008, pp. 11–35), and serious
lies (those lies that involve more risk and have more
damaging consequences) are often used to cover illegal or
immoral acts performed by the signaller (DePaulo et al.
2004). The misuse of symbolic signals to foster selfish
advantages may present a threat to social structures based
on cooperation and collective action. Perceivers of sym-
bolic signals are therefore required to use cues beyond the
information that is literally encoded in the signal, in order
to evaluate the intentions of the signallers.
Inferential pragmatics suggest that perceivers infer the
communicative intentions of signallers based on a Coop-
erative Principle (Grice 1989) or following the principle of
relevance according to which utterances that yield the
highest positive cognitive effect with the lowest processing
effort will be given greater relevance (Wilson and Sperber
2006). Because signallers can exploit perceivers’ natural
tendency to maximize relevance, relying solely on the
symbolic content of signals may not be a beneficial strategy
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to make social inferences. Rather, perceivers will take into
account a variety of contextual cues to make their judg-
ments. The most prevalent contextual cues to symbolic
signals are the nonverbal components that are invariably
associated with them in face-to-face interactions. These
components are either social signals or social cues dis-
played simultaneously to the symbolic message. The
interaction between symbolic and nonsymbolic signals is
still poorly understood, although it is believed that
attending to nonverbal cues is a good strategy to detect
deceitful intentions in a signaller (Ekman 1985; Vrij 2008;
Zuckerman et al. 1981a, b). Of course, other contextual
cues (the physical aspects of a situation, the presence of
other individuals, the past interactions between signaller
and perceiver) are also taken into account in the perceiver’s
inferences.
Some have argued that emotional expressions play a role
in the perception of trustworthiness (Boone and Buck
2004) and that they could act as honest signals of dispo-
sitions and social intentions (Brown and Moore 2002;
Frank 1988; Mehu et al. 2007a, b). Little is known, how-
ever, about how the mechanisms underlying the production
and perception of the relationship between symbolic and
emotional signals, as researcher have not analysed the
interconnection between these communicative components
in great details. It is believed that the congruence between
emotional and symbolic signals could be taken as sup-
porting the authenticity of the semantic content encoded in
the symbolic component of the signal. For example, when
speaking of an emotional event, speakers should also dis-
play nonverbal cues congruent with that emotional expe-
rience (e.g., Duchenne smiles when talking of joyful
event). A discrepancy between the emotional cues dis-
played and the assumed emotional experience associated
with the event is taken as a possible indicator that the
content of symbolic signals should not be trusted (Ekman
1985; Zuckerman et al. 1981a, b). This account may pose
problem because it relies on the assumption that emotional
components have specific meaning, that is, correspond to
particular classes of emotion, a question still debated in the
psychological literature (Scherer and Ellgring 2007a).
Moreover, it assumes that some situations invariably lead
to particular emotional experiences, while it is reasonable
to expect individual differences in the way people react to a
given situation (Davidson 1992; Kring et al. 1994).
According to that model, the evaluation of a signaller’s
intentions based on the relationship between symbolic and
emotional signals should therefore take into account a
person’s prototypical responsiveness (Ekman 1985).
Psychological research showed that emotional cues play
an important role in interpersonal perception, as these cues
strongly influence judgments of dispositions and intentions.
We also discussed the importance of intentional production
of coded messages in human communication, nuancing the
fact that not all signals or cues that lead to social inferences
actually involve encoded meaning. We have also discussed
the relationship between symbolic and emotional signals
and the possible role of the latter in reliable communica-
tion. This relationship should be better understood within
the context of multimodal communication, the topic of the
next section.
Multimodal signals
The importance of multimodality is the object of a large
consensus among researchers studying communication in
ethology (Partan and Marler 2005; Rowe 1999), emotion
psychology (Ekman and Friesen 1967; Massaro and Egan
1996; Scherer and Ellgring 2007b), cognitive neuroscience
(Ghazanfar and Schroeder 2006; Pourtois et al. 2005),
human–computer interaction (Jaimes and Sebe 2007), and
affective computing (Bianchi-Berthouze and Lisetti 2002;
Picard 1997). No one seems to question the idea that
organisms communicate via a number of modalities:
auditory, visual, olfactory, and tactile; and that modalities
can include a number of channels, for example visual
signals are displayed in the face, body, and hands. Multi-
modal communication most probably evolved as a result of
perceivers’ capacity to integrate information acquired
through different channels and modalities and to use the
combined input to optimize their responses to environ-
mental conditions, including social situations. Multimodal
signals are assumed to optimize communication through an
increase in information transfer—the different modalities
and channels convey different types of information, and
robustness—the same information is conveyed through
different channels (or modalities) to increase resistance to
noise (Ay et al. 2007; Partan and Marler 2005). Rather than
exclusively convey particular types of information, the
different components of multimodal signals could also
function to attract attention to the signaller, to prevent
habituation to a signal, to prime or modulate the readiness
to another signal, to increase memorability of other com-
ponents, in other words, to increase the efficiency of a
signal at provoking a response in the perceiver (see Rowe
1999 for a review). We will argue here that some com-
ponents of multimodal signals displayed in human inter-
actions function to ensure the reliability of related signal
components.
Earlier we presented the idea that perceiver psychology
is a major selective pressure for the evolution of social
signals. Guilford and Dawkins (1991) underlined important
perceptual modules involved in the processing of signals:
detectability (the capacity to detect the signal in the chaos
of environmental stimuli), discriminability (the capacity to
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tell a signal apart from other signals), and memorability
(the capacity to remember the signal in other situations).
Habituation to external stimuli may also place a significant
pressure on signalling, as to be responded to signals will
need to avoid habituation of the perceiver (Searcy 1992).
Further down the road of processing, mind-reading ability
(the capacity to infer intentions to a signaller) and the
evaluation of reliability of the coded information provided
in symbolic signals are two inference mechanisms that may
have evolved in response to deception. Preliminary evi-
dence about the latter mechanism come from studies on
perception emotional expressions in which individuals
were shown to agree about authenticity of nonverbal por-
trayals of emotion (Mehu et al. 2012; Thibault et al. 2009).
Other perceptual mechanisms involved in signal processing
are relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995), but possibly also
appraisal checks derived from appraisal theories of emo-
tion (Scherer 2001). Finally, the nature of the mental rep-
resentations formed upon the perception of social cues and
signals may well have driven the evolution of social signals
towards greater abstract or conceptual information content.
The multimodal nature of signals may therefore reflect
the diversity of perceptual mechanisms involved in the
processing of social stimuli present in the environment. In
this view, multimodal signals would integrate several
components that evolved to derive benefits from perceptual
mechanisms: some components would be loaded with
socially constructed meaning (like symbols), while other
components (cost-added signals or handicaps, minimal cost
signals, and indices) would mostly relate to individual
attributes of the organism that are of interest to perceivers
(identity related signals like age, sex, and personality, but
also motivational signals like emotional expressions or
conditional tendencies to react in a particular situation).
Finally, other components, which could be exemplified by
behaviour like pointing or gazing, would work to contex-
tualize the communicative event by prompting perceivers
to focus on particular aspects of the situation. Since these
components act to contextualize communication, they can
plausibly be called meta-communicative components.5
This view implies that only the symbolic components of a
multimodal signal would convey encoded messages, reli-
able components would maintain a natural relationship
with socially adaptive characteristics of the signaller,
whereas meta-communicative components would not carry
information in and of themselves. Symbolic components
and meta-communicative components can be produced
intentionally, hence could be used in deceptive communi-
cation (though not exclusively) whereas reliable
components would depend on complex interactions
between psychobiological and social factors on which
conscious planning and intentionality has only little con-
trol. Note that the different components of multimodal
signals could, in some cases, act as social signals on their
own.
The association between the different components of a
multimodal signal could play an important role in the
perception of authenticity, whereby the presence of com-
ponents that reliably indicates the signaller’s motivations
and intentions could be used by perceivers to evaluate the
reliability of symbolic information conveyed by other
components. This idea is implicit in research that considers
whether the congruence (or incongruence) between non-
verbal emotional cues and verbal signals indicates that a
person is telling the truth or is lying (Ekman 1985; Zuck-
erman et al. 1981a, b). A crucial question is whether per-
ceived authenticity is achieved from the different signal
components occurring in synchrony, or whether certain
components are displayed earlier in a sequence in order to
frame the effect of later components. In the field of emo-
tional communication, the synchronization between dif-
ferent expressive systems is viewed as an indicator of
reliability (Mortillaro et al. 2011) because this synchroni-
zation would represent the efferent effects of cognitive
evaluations underlying emotional states (Scherer 2009),
hence could only occur when the conditions for a given
emotion are met. Reliable multimodal signals could also be
characterized by a sequential built up of several compo-
nents, with early (or late) emotional, or motivational,
components having a contextual effect on the symbolic
components. Future research should concentrate on the
patterns of association between different components of
multimodal signals and on the effects these different pat-
terns have on the perception of authenticity of a signaller’s
intentions.
SSP: what should the ‘‘processing’’ be about?
Broadly defined, social signal processing involves the
automatic processing and synthesis, by means of computer
programs, of social signals and social cues that are found in
human communication. Our motivation to engage in col-
laboration on automatic processing of social behaviour is
partly driven by the current drawbacks and needs of psy-
chological research. We identify four areas in which
automatic analysis could greatly benefit behavioural
research. First, automatic analysis could provide more
systematic and reliable measures of the physical properties
of signals and cues, including their temporal dynamics.
Second, automatic systems could manage the processing of
a larger number of cues extracted from an individual
5 Although similar, our concept of meta-communicative component
is not precisely the same as the concept of meta-communicative signal
introduced by Bekoff (1972).
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(social cues) and from the situational context. This point is
essential to address multimodal communication and to
assess the impact of the context on signalling. Third,
automatic systems appear to be necessary to extract pat-
terns of association between indicators displayed by an
individual, but also patterns of synchronization or influence
between several individuals. Finally, data harvested by
automatic systems could be used to predict outcome of
social interactions and relationships.
At the most basic level, we think that the processing of
social signals should include at least three steps (Fig. 2).
The first step involves the detection, tracking, and classi-
fication of distal indicators (perceptible manifestations of
individuals) using theory-free labels. At this stage, input to
the system comprises audio and video recordings captured
in optimal conditions (adequate lighting, reduced back-
ground noise, absence of machine generated artefacts). The
output of this step is classified using physically relevant
units of analysis like fundamental frequency (F0), voice
formants, facial action units, or other theoretically neutral
behavioural units. Whenever possible, the extraction of
features should reflect temporal changes in intensity of the
measured parameter and should operate on a comparable
time window across channels and modalities in order to
allow multimodal analysis of social signals. The acquisi-
tion of these measurements depends on the tools that are
currently being developed towards automatic analysis of
facial behaviour (Bartlett et al. 1999; Cohn et al. 1999; for
a review see Pantic and Rothkrantz 2000) and the extrac-
tion of vocal parameters (Boersma 2001). Automatic
analysis of postures and gestures still represents a chal-
lenge for SSP but progresses have been made on the
detection of head movements (Kapoor and Picard 2001;
Kawato and Ohya 2000; Tan and Rong 2003) as well as
hand gestures (Erol et al. 2007; Morency et al. 2005) and
body movements (Oikonomopoulos et al. 2009).
The second step involves the detection of contextual
information that is necessary to interpret the function of
social signals. This can be a variety of aspects of the
physical environment such as the presence of valuable
resources or physical constraints to signalling. Automatic
processing systems should also take into account the social
context like the number of individuals present as well as
their age, sex, motivations, and interpersonal relationships.
Input at that stage comprises information obtained online
that reflect socio-environmental conditions (respective
Fig. 2 Essential steps for social signal processing
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location of individuals, vocal features, etc.) and possibly, in
some laboratory situations, physiological measurement like
heart rate and respiration. The output of online capture of
socio-environmental conditions would be expressed in
terms of interpersonal distances, age and sex of individuals
(inferred from vocal parameters) and estimates of emo-
tional arousal. Tools for the extraction of contextual
information from the physical environment are being
developed (Beadle et al. 1997), and ideas for their inte-
gration into a more complex computing environment have
emerged (Ben-Mokhtar and Capra 2009; Henricksen and
Indulska 2006; Zhou et al. 2010). Automatic analysis of
social context has, however, not yet been developed, pos-
sibly due to a lack of consensus on how to annotate social
situations. Data about the context should also include
information collected offline about the factors that cannot
be captured live by sensors such as information about the
outcome of past interactions between signallers and per-
ceivers, preferences and attitudes expressed through self-
report, assessment of personality, or position in a formal
hierarchy. The latter type of information may be more
difficult to collect and special care should be taken to
specify its nature and origin (self-report, behavioural
measures, time these measures were taken, etc.). The
information taken at step 2 is used as is and passed directly
to the next stage of the process.
The third step is concerned with the integration of out-
puts of steps 1 and 2. At this stage, information about
features is integrated to contextual information and patterns
of association between these two types of information are
computed. These associations should represent: (a) tempo-
ral contingencies between cues/signals and contextual
information at the individual level and (b) temporal con-
tingencies between contextual information and signals/cues
displayed by all the individuals involved in the interaction.
These patterns of association could help understand the
influence of context on social signals and cues, but also the
inter-dependency between different individuals’ behav-
ioural streams (Gardner and Griffin 1989) or people’s
adaptation to their interactive partner (Cappella 1996).
These patterns of association can then be used to model the
outcome of an interaction (Carrere and Gottman 1999;
Patterson 1982). The output of the third step includes
inferences about psychobiological characteristics of the
signaller, the probability that individuals will engage in a
particular behaviour, and an estimation of the outcome of
the social interaction in terms of individual and collective
benefits.
To summarize, inputs to the system at different stages
include (a) raw information that can be captured by sensors
including distal indicators (step 1) and ‘‘online’’ contextual
information (step 2); (b) conceptual information that rep-
resents factors that cannot be directly captured by sensors:
outcome of past interactions, subjective preferences, etc.
(step 2); and (c) captured information such as physiological
measurements, psychological assessment of personality.
(step 2). The final output of the system will include an
augmented knowledge about the signaller’s internal state
taking into account the relationship between the different
units of input. This markedly differs from earlier classifi-
cation methods that based their outputs (often a limited
number of emotion categories) on visual features only,
largely ignoring the importance of context on the attribu-
tion of internal states to the signaller. An important element
of output is an assessment of the probability of the signaller
to engage in a particular course of action, assessment that
can inform about adaptive social decision-making. The real
challenge is not only to develop tools that automatically
acquire the necessary information at each step of the pro-
cess, but also to integrate these tools in a coherent platform
that will provide the desired output (output that will ulti-
mately depend on the application users want to make of the
system).
The inclusion of subjective interpersonal judgements as
a variable into the system may be desirable. However, it is
necessary to evaluate the circumstances in which these
judgements were made in order to have an idea about
possible contextual influences on these ratings. If SSP
researchers want to implement ‘‘meaning’’ as an output of
their system, it is important that the level of interpretations
made by automatic systems represents the largest consen-
sus possible between human perceivers within the targeted
cultural group and that it acknowledges the different levels
of interpretation resulting from individual differences
between human perceivers. In other words, the output of an
automatic system expressed in ‘‘meaning’’ terms should be
weighted on a continuum that goes from idiosyncratic
interpretation of a given behaviour to a consensual mean-
ing based on interpretations by the entire population.
Nevertheless, inferences about function or about a signal-
ler’s intentions should be preferred to inferences about
meaning, as the former outputs offer greater predictive
power with regard to the future outcome of interactions.
The quality of the output at the three stages depends on
the amount of data that can be captured and on the
recording conditions, the latter being optimal in highly
controlled laboratory settings that isolate the individual
from sources of interference. However, the need to extract
features that are as close as possible to natural behaviour
asks for laboratory settings that are not too constraining for
individual behaviour. The use of individual samples of
natural behaviour recorded ‘‘on the fly’’ in the field or from
the media should be evaluated with respect to the impor-
tance of strategic behaviour and the availability of a min-
imum of control information allowing appropriate
statistical inferences (see Scherer 2011). Therefore, the
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difficult task is to find a compromise between ecological
validity and quality of recordings. An example of a por-
table tool that can be used to measure vocal features, body
motion, and relative location in the social space is descri-
bed in Olguı´n Olguı´n et al. (2009). Because the use of
mobile devices presents an excellent initiative to record
behaviour as it occurs in natural interactions, these tools
appear to be crucial in the development of social signal
processing.
Conclusion
The synthesis between ethology and social psychology
promises to boost our understanding of social signalling by
integrating a functional, evolutionary, approach to behav-
iour with the mechanisms involved in the production and
perception of social behaviour. We argue that SSP will
greatly benefit from such an integration of concepts
because the combination of both disciplines promises to
enlarge the scope of research questions traditionally
addressed in communication research. For example, the
important distinction between social signals and social cues
should inform the attitude to take regarding the reliability
of interpretation that is usually made about the features
detected by automatic processing systems. The psycho-
ethological approach to SSP should also bring new insight
into the type of social information available from social
signals and cues, by combining research findings from
biologically oriented research and from emotion and per-
sonality psychology. Finally, behavioural sciences will
benefit from the development of tools that can enlarge the
range of measures and procedures for the analysis of social
behaviour.
By introducing ethological principles to the study of
social signals, we underlined the importance of focusing on
the functional aspects of signals and cues rather than on the
pursuit of their absolute meaning. The investigation of
context and consequences of signals is crucial if we want to
understand their role in social relationships and if we want
to prevent undesired outcomes of social interactions. The
utility of this approach has to be found in the practical
applications of SSP research to a variety of domains in
human relations, for example, conflict resolution, clinical
settings, intra- and inter-group interactions, etc. Virtually
all domains that require understanding of human behaviour
could benefit from SSP research.
At the heart of SSP lays a tight collaboration between
computer oriented and human oriented scientists, who
should both benefit from the findings made in each field.
We believe that the standard measurement systems (that
mostly rely on manual annotations) and the modelling
techniques that are traditionally utilized in psychology may
not be sufficient to understand the complexity of human
communication. The development of new measurement
tools and modelling algorithms will therefore complement
and enhance the scope of psychological research. Con-
versely, the rich literature in academic disciplines like
linguistics, psychology, and ethology has generated ideas
that will help formulate appropriate research questions to
guide the development of new tools and modelling tech-
niques. This back and forth movement of ideas and tech-
nology between human sciences and computer sciences
fuels the engine that will push the field of SSP forward.
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